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 Prepotent actions are actions that are strongly triggered by the environment, and so tend to be 
carried out, unless intentionally avoided. Understanding what makes an action prepotent is 
central to an understanding of inhibitory control. The current study investigated actions made on 
artifacts, since in artifact-dense cultures, much everyday behavior is focused them. Eighty 3-
year-olds were tested on a Go/no-go task that required children to make an action on go trials, 
and to withhold it on no-go trials. These actions were made on artifacts with which the actions 
were either associated (e.g., drawing with a crayon) or unassociated (e.g., drawing with a 
hammer). Failure to avoid the go action on no-go trials was taken as evidence that the action was 
prepotent. Results suggested that an action did not need to be associated with an artifact in order 
for it to be prepotent (so drawing with a hammer could be prepotent). However, associated 
actions were sometimes produced even when children had been instructed to make an 
unassociated action. Children sometimes drew with a crayon when told to hammer with it, but 
never hammered when told to draw. 
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When is inhibitory control needed to stop an action? The consensus view from cognitive 
psychology seems to be that inhibitory control is needed when an automatically triggered action 
is incompatible with current goals. Many of the automatic responses we make are perfectly 
appropriate to our situation – such as turning a handle to open a door. Being able to automatize 
frequently used actions benefits cognitive efficiency. However, actions that are triggered 
automatically run the risk of being in conflict with current goals, and will require inhibitory 
control to stop them. Such automatically triggered actions are said to be ‘prepotent’. Thus, the 
need for inhibition to control action often depends on the inappropriate triggering of prepotent 
responses. It is clear, therefore, that understanding prepotency is an integral part of building an 
explanatory account of how inhibitory control, and the executive system more generally, 
develops (Simpson, Riggs, Beck, Gorniak, Abbott & Diamond, 2012).  
In the research reported here, we investigate the prepotency of manual actions made on 
artifacts (i.e., manufactured objects). This kind of action is important because, in artifact-dense 
cultures, much everyday behavior is made on artifacts. As such, they provide a valuable 
opportunity to investigate inhibitory control under conditions that pertain in everyday life, and 
can complement the short-term stimulus-response associations set up in many laboratory 
investigations of inhibition. Actions on artifacts typically involve learned associations built up 
over time. Most artifacts are associated with a specific action, related to the artifact’s function: 
for example, a cup is associated with the specific action |grasp by handle and lift to mouth|. A 
key question is whether these artifact-specific associations influence prepotency in children 
(Barrett, Davis & Needham, 2007; Simpson & Riggs, 2007). The current study investigates 
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whether actions that are associated with an artifact’s function are more prepotent than other, 
unassociated actions.  
One previous study has investigated artifact-action prepotency, using the Box-search task, 
an object-based variant of the Go/no-go paradigm (Simpson & Riggs, 2007). Children were 
shown a series of boxes, and were told to open boxes with one type of cue on the lid (go trials) 
and to leave shut boxes with another type of cue (no-go trials). Go-trial boxes contained stickers, 
which children could keep. Inappropriate go responses made on no-go trials were assumed to 
reflect a failure to inhibit a prepotent go action. Simpson and Riggs (2007) argued that opening a 
box is prepotent in the box-search task because of the learned association between boxes and 
opening. They proposed that, because of this association, activating the perceptual representation 
of a box leads to some activation of the motor representation for opening.  
Support for the proposal that artifact-action associations underlie prepotency came from a 
comparison of two versions of the Box-search task (Experiment 2, Simpson & Riggs, 2007). In 
the (standard) Habitual condition, children performed the action associated with boxes on go 
trials (they opened boxes), whereas in the Novel condition, they performed an action 
unassociated with boxes (they put a hoop over boxes for the experimenter to open). In the 
Habitual condition, 3-year-olds erred on about 50% of no-go trials (i.e., they opened boxes). In 
contrast, in the Novel condition, children erred on just 10% of no-go trials; and these errors 
involved opening boxes, not putting hoops over them. The fact that children never put hoops 
over boxes on no-go trials suggested that only the specific action associated with boxes (i.e., 
opening them) was prepotent in the task. In other words, only the action associated with the 
artifact generated prepotent responses. It was also found that prepotency on this task was not 
affected by the presence of a reward (Experiment 3, Simpson & Riggs, 2007). In the Box-search 
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task, the consequence of opening boxes on a go trial was to win a sticker (which only the go 
boxes contained). However, children made equal numbers of box-opening errors on no-go trials, 
irrespective of whether they received a sticker on go trials. Thus, children were not more likely 
to respond on no-go trials when making that response was rewarded on go trials. Overall, the 
prepotency of the to-be-inhibited response appeared to be determined by an artifact-action 
association, and not by the presence of a reward. 
We suggest three reasons to question the Box-search methodology. First, in the Box-search 
task, the unassociated action was to place a hoop over the boxes. Holding the hoop may have 
prevented children from box-opening – it is harder to open a box when you are holding a hoop. It 
is possible, therefore, that children would have opened more boxes in the Novel condition if a 
different unassociated action were used – one in which they were not holding another object. 
Second, using the hoop in the Novel condition also introduced a second kind of artifact to the 
Box-search task (in addition to the boxes). We do not know what the effect of this second artifact 
was. It could have further reduced children’s tendency to open boxes by attracting their attention 
away from the boxes and towards the hoop. And third, it is possible that the hoop-over action 
used in the Box-search task is a ‘special case’, that is not typical of most unassociated actions. 
Beck, Carroll, Brunsdon and Gryg (2011) have suggested that when children use an unfamiliar 
method to select a response (such as pointing with an arrow), it leads to more accurate 
responding. They suggest that children are less impulsive (i.e., think more about what to do) 
when acting in this way, and so are more likely to respond correctly. It is possible that children 
made no hoop-over errors in the Box-search task because they were less impulsive when using 
this unfamiliar method to select responses. Thus the Box-search data may not tell us whether 
unassociated actions are, in general, less prepotent than associated actions. 
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Currently then, the proposal that artifact-action associations underlie prepotency rests on 
the finding that children make more no-go errors in the associated-action than unassociated-
action versions of the Box-search task (Simpson & Riggs, 2007). However, we suggest that the 
choice of unassociated action makes this finding difficult to interpret. In the present study, we 
sought a more reliable test of whether learned associations modulate the prepotency of actions 
made on artifacts. Children were tested on a new variant of the Go/no-go task (the Artifact 
Go/no-go task) that manipulated the relation between an artifact and action. There were two 
conditions: In the Associated condition, the artifact and action were associated (e.g., a crayon 
and the action of drawing). In the Unassociated condition, there was no association between 
artifact and action (e.g., a crayon and the action of hammering). If artifact-action associations 
modulate prepotency, then no-go accuracy should be: (i) low in the Associated condition, 
because seeing the crayon should trigger the associated action of drawing; and (ii) high in the 
Unassociated condition, because seeing the crayon should not trigger the unassociated action of 
hammering. If, on the other hand, this relation does not modulate response prepotency, then 
manipulating the pairing of artifact and action should have no effect on no-go accuracy.  
The Artifact Go/no-go task improved on the Box-search task in three ways. First, unlike 
the Box-search task, there is no ‘second artifact’ (i.e., no hoop) in the Unassociated condition of 
the Artifact Go/no-go task. A single artifact was used on each trial with both the Associated and 
Unassociated condition of the Artifact Go/no-go task. Second, in the Box-search task, different 
actions were used in the Habitual and Novel conditions. Simpson and Riggs (2007) assumed that 
what made children perform differently in the two conditions was that the opening action was 
associated with a box (in the Habitual condition), and the hoop-over action was not (in the Novel 
condition). However, it may be some other property that distinguished the two actions. This may 
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have been the case if, for example, children were less impulsive when selecting boxes using the 
hoop than when opening them directly (Beck et al., 2011). In the Artifact Go/no-go task the same 
action is used in the Associated and Unassociated conditions; what changes is the artifact with 
which it is made. Third, in the Artifact Go/no-go task it was possible to test a range of artifacts 
rather than just one (the box in the Box-search task). We tested four artifacts – a mobile phone, 
handled cup, hammer and crayon – having first checked that young children knew the associated 
action for each.  
In the Artifact Go/no-go task, children were presented sequentially with examples of a 
single artifact kind (e.g., a series of crayons). If the item was colored blue, the child was to make 
a go response, and if it was colored red, the child was to make no response. Each child 
completed two conditions: the Associated condition (e.g., drawing with a crayon) and the 
Unassociated condition (e.g., lifting a cup to the ear). Each condition comprised four practice 
trials followed by sixteen test trials. The artifacts and actions were arranged in four 
counterbalanced combinations, shown in Table 1. This ensured that they were used equally often 
in the Associated and Unassociated conditions. 
Method 
Participants. Eighty children (39 girls and 41 boys) participated in the study. Children were 
aged between 3;0 and 3;8 (mean age 3;4). All children attended nurseries in a semi-rural county 
of England, spoke English as a first language, and none had behavioral or educational problems. 
The majority of children were white and from a middle-class background. 
Design. A repeated-measures design was used. The independent variables were Trial type (Go, 
No-go) and Artifact-action relation (Associated, Unassociated). Dependent variables were 
accuracy and error type (associated versus unassociated errors). 
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Table 1. The four artifact-action combinations used in the Artifact Go/no-go task. Each artifact 




Associated condition Unassociated condition 
1 lift phone to ear draw on paper with hammer  
2 hammer on paper with hammer lift phone to mouth 
3 lift cup to mouth hammer on paper with crayon 
4 draw on paper with crayon lift cup to ear  
Materials. Four kinds of artifact were used: toy mobile phones, plastic handled cups, toy 
hammers, and crayons. As each condition comprised twenty trials in total, twenty objects of each 
kind were used, with 10 colored red and 10 colored blue. These objects were chosen as they each 
had a single specific action strongly associated with them: in pilot testing, more than 90% of 
children were able to spontaneously demonstrate the action associated with each of these 
artifacts. Following the method of Simpson and Riggs (2007), two strips of card were used (150 
mm by 800mm), and eight artifacts were placed on each strip. A third strip of card concealed the 
artifacts so that children could not see the color of the item that would appear next.  
Procedure. Each child completed an Associated and an Unassociated condition. Overall, four 
different combinations of action and artifact were used (shown in Table 1). Each child received 
one of these four combinations. So for example, in the Associated condition children were told to 
lift blue phones to their ear (go trials), but to make no response to red phones (no-go trials); and 
in the Unassociated condition, they were told to make a drawing action with blue hammers (go 
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trials), but to make no response to red hammers (no-go trials). The combinations ensured that 
different artifacts and actions were used in the two conditions presented to a child. This was done 
to reduce the likelihood of carry-over effects between the two conditions. The order of 
administration of the conditions was also counterbalanced. 
At the start of each condition, children received four practice trials with feedback (in a 
fixed order: go, no-go, go, no-go). Then, for the test trials, children were given a further reminder 
of the rules, after which eight objects were placed on the table, concealed by a strip of card. 
Objects were revealed one at a time, and children were given approximately two seconds to 
respond. If a child did not respond in that time, the response was recorded as ‘no-go,’ and the 
experimenter revealed the next object. After the first eight trials, the next eight objects were 
placed on the table, covered by the card. These objects were again revealed one at a time. Each 
child completed one Associated condition and one Unassociated condition. Within each 
condition, the 16 test trials were presented in a pseudorandom order, with eight go trials and 
eight no-go trials. No feedback was given.  
Results 
Mean accuracy is shown in Figure 1. Go accuracy was near ceiling in the Associated 
condition (almost 100%) but lower in the Unassociated condition (83%). No-go accuracy was 
low in both conditions (around 65%). Preliminary analyses found no significant order effect for 
completing the Associated or Unassociated condition first (p = .20), and no difference in 
performance according to the type of artifact used (p = .11). Data were analysed using a 
repeated-measures ANOVA, with Trial type (Go, No-go) and Artifact-action relation 
(Associated, Unassociated) as factors. There were significant main effects for Trial type, 
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F(1,76)=51.45, p<.001, η2=.404, and Artifact-action relation, F(1,76)=8.05, p=.006, η2=.096, as 
well as a significant interaction, F(1,76)=13.83, p<.001, η2=.150.  
 
Figure 1. Accuracy on go and no-go trials for the Associated condition (black squares) and the 
Unassociated (white circles) condition. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
 
  
A planned comparison looking only at no-go accuracy found no quantitative difference 
between the Associated and Unassociated conditions, p=.140. However, an analysis of the type 
of error made on no-go trials indicated a qualitative difference: In the Unassociated condition 
(e.g., hammering with a crayon) children erred by making both associated responses (drawing, 
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on 10% of no-go trials) and unassociated responses (hammering, on 21% of no-go trials). In 
contrast, in the Associated condition (e.g., drawing with a crayon) children only erred by making 
the associated go response (drawing on 38% of no-go trials). Nevertheless, while children made 
associated responses in the Unassociated condition, they did so significantly less often than in 
the Associated condition (t(79)=8.39, p<.001, 95% CI 21 to 34%), in which they were told to 
make these responses. 
There was significantly poorer go accuracy in the Unassociated condition than in the 
Associated condition, t(79)=5.248, p<.001, 95% CI 10 to 22%. This poor go accuracy was 
caused by children making the associated response (e.g., drawing with the crayon when they 
should have been hammering with it), rather than by them failing to respond at all. Thus, overall, 
children made associated errors on both go and no-go trials of the Unassociated condition, but 
never made unassociated errors on the Associated condition. 
Discussion 
The present study sought to investigate whether the associations children learn between 
artifacts and actions affect prepotency. An Associated condition (in which there was a learned 
association between artifacts and actions) was compared to an Unassociated condition (where 
artifacts and actions were unrelated). Behavior on these conditions differed, for both go and no-
go trials. For go trials, in the Unassociated condition (e.g., when asked to make a hammering 
action with a crayon), children erred by making the response associated with that artifact (e.g., 
drawing with the crayon). In the Associated condition, children never produced any of the 
unassociated actions on go trials (e.g., they never hammered with a crayon). For no-go trials, 
conditions did not differ significantly in overall accuracy, as children made comparable numbers 
of no-go errors in the Associated and Unassociated conditions. Despite this, the conditions again 
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differed in the types of errors made. Children in the Unassociated condition made both associated 
and unassociated errors (e.g., both drawing and hammering with a crayon); whereas in the 
Associated condition they only made associated errors (only drawing with the crayon). 
Crucially however, despite these differences between the Associated and Unassociated 
conditions, children did make some unassociated errors on no-go trials in the Unassociated 
condition. So, for example, when told to hammer with a crayon on go trials, children did 
sometimes err by hammering on no-go trials. This finding suggests that actions made on artifacts 
can be prepotent irrespective of whether that action is associated with that artifact (e.g., 
hammering with a crayon can be prepotent). In this respect, the present Artifact Go/no-go data 
differ from previous results obtained with the Box-search task (Simpson & Riggs, 2007). In the 
box-search study, children made no unassociated (hoop-over) errors, consistent with the idea that 
unassociated actions are not prepotent in that task. One explanation for this between-task 
difference is that children were less impulsive when making the specific unassociated action 
used in the Box-search task (placing a hoop over boxes – Beck et al., 2011). Children had 
difficulty with all four unassociated actions used in the current study – which suggests that many 
unassociated actions can be prepotent. However, data from the Box-search task suggest that not 
all unassociated actions produce poor performance.  Further research is needed to determine 
whether other unassociated actions can produce good performance on Go/no-go tasks.  The 
question of what makes the hoop-over action different from the four used here also needs to be 
explored. 
It is informative to consider the different kinds of error that children made in the 
Associated and Unassociated condition of the Artifact Go/no-go task. Young children sometimes 
erred by making associated actions in the Unassociated condition (on both go and no-go trials), 
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but they never made unassociated actions in the Associated condition. It is unsurprising that 
children did not make a ‘random’ action – such as hammering with a crayon – unless they had 
previously been told to do so. What is important is that they did sometimes draw with crayons 
despite been asked to do something else. We suggest that it was only telling children to make the 
unassociated action on go trials that made it prepotent, and thus hard to inhibit, on no-go trials. In 
contrast, associated actions were prepotent irrespective of what children were asked to do. Thus 
our data suggest that young children have learned associations between specific artifacts and 
specific actions, and that this knowledge causes them to sometimes make associated actions in 
the Unassociated condition, even though these learned associations are not necessary to make the 
action prepotent. Any action can be prepotent in the Artifact Go/no-go task, as long as children 
are asked to make that action on go trials. To put it another way, the current data strongly suggest 
that prepotency can be derived both from previous experience, and from short-term, task-specific 
associations. 
If both associated and unassociated actions can be prepotent in the Artifact Go/no-go task, 
the next question is whether they are equally prepotent, or whether one is more prepotent than 
the other. Is there evidence that associated actions are activated more strongly than unassociated 
ones? Data from the Unassociated condition can speak to this question. In this condition, 
children made around twice as many unassociated errors (21%) as associated errors (10%) on no-
go trials. This suggests that unassociated actions are more prepotent than associated ones in this 
condition, and that specifying the response to be made at the start of a task is sufficient to make 
that response prepotent. However, in the Associated condition, children never made any 
unassociated actions, suggesting that these unassociated actions were not prepotent at all in this 
condition. Our findings extend and support previous research (e.g., Hanauer & Brooks, 2005; 
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Simpson & Riggs, 2011) suggesting that children’s short-term goals or intentions (based on what 
they were asked to do in the task) strongly influence prepotency. The present findings add further 
weight to the notion that task demands can modulate the prepotency of an action. 
In the Introduction we noted that much everyday behavior is made on artifacts. What do 
the current data tell us about young children’s capacity to control this behavior? As Simpson and 
Riggs (2007) suggest, if children’s intentions strongly influence prepotency then it is likely that, 
for the most part, only the artifact-actions children intend to make will be prepotent. If this is the 
case then inappropriate actions (i.e., those actions that conflict with current intentions) are 
unlikely to be prepotent and children’s action control should be good. However, children may 
have problems preventing the over-extension of intended actions. So, for example, children may 
intend to cut a piece of paper with scissors, but move on to cutting a nearby book, and then to 
their own hair. This is essentially what happens in the go/no-go task: children’s intended action 
spreads from go trials (where it is appropriate) to no-go trials (where it is not).  
The current findings differ from the Box-search data (Simpson & Riggs, 2007) by 
demonstrating that it may be just as easy for unassociated actions (e.g., hammering with scissors) 
to get out of control as associated ones (e.g., cutting with scissors). Our data also speak to a 
further topic of long-standing interest to developmental psychologists (e.g., Jarrold, Carruthers, 
Smith & Boucher, 1994): what cognitive abilities allow children to engage in pretend play (e.g., 
pretending a hair-brush is a microphone)? The problem, in this context, is how do children with 
weak inhibitory control avoid the action associated with an artifact (e.g., putting a brush to your 
hair), when making an unassociated play action (e.g., putting a brush to your mouth)? As in our 
Unassociated condition, children’s intention to make the unassociated play action may be 
sufficient to make it more prepotent than the associated action. 
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Research over the past two decades has established that inhibitory control plays a central 
role in the development of many important cognitive skills. Despite this, we still know little 
about the factors that determine when inhibition is needed. Careful experimental design will be 
required to disentangle these factors, and the present study offers one way of addressing this 
important question. It emphasizes that prepotency is not a simple phenomenon. Rather, it can be 
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